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We discuss a connection between Bell nonlocality and Bayesian games. This link offers interesting
perspectives for Bayesian games, namely to allow the players to receive advice in the form of nonlocal
correlations, for instance using entangled quantum particles or more general no-signaling boxes. The
possibility of having such ’nonlocal advice’ will lead to novel joint strategies, impossible to achieve
in the classical setting. This implies that quantum resources, or more general no-signaling resources,
offer a genuine advantage over classical ones. Moreover, some of these strategies can represent equi-
librium points, leading to the notion of quantum/no-signaling Nash equilibrium. Finally we describe
new types of question in the study of nonlocality, namely the consideration of non-local advantage
when there is a set of Bell expressions.
On several occasions in the history of science, differ-
ent areas of research, sharing a priori nothing in com-
mon and sometimes belonging to completely different
fields of science, were shown to be closely related. In
certain cases, these links turned out to be spectacu-
lar and tremendously fruitful, such as the connection
between differential geometry and relativity. In the
present paper, we discuss such a link, albeit a much
more modest one, between Bell nonlocality and the
theory of Bayesian games—also referred to as games
with incomplete information.
Nonlocality is arguably among the most dramatic
and counter-intuitive features of quantum mechanics.
In a nutshell, quantum theory is at odds with the prin-
ciple of locality, which states that an object is influ-
enced directly only by its immediate surroundings,
and not by remotely located objects. Two remote ob-
servers sharing a pair of entangled quantum particles,
can establish correlations which evade any possible
explanation in classical physics. On the one hand, a
signal is excluded, as it would have to travel faster
than light. On the other, the correlated behaviour is
not the result of a pre-established strategy, as demon-
strated by Bell in 1964 [1]. Notably, this phenomenon
of quantum nonlocality, confirmed experimentally [2]
via the violation of so-called Bell inequalities, turns
out to be useful in practice, in particular for informa-
tion processing [3, 4]. More recently a theory of gen-
eralized nonlocal correlations has been developed [6],
which has direct impact on fundamental questions in
the foundations of quantum mechanics [7].
In a completely different area, but only 3 years after
Bell’s ground-breaking discovery, Harsanyi [5] devel-
oped a framework for games with incomplete infor-
mation, that is, games in which players have only par-
tial information about the setting in which the game
is played. For instance, each player may have some
private information, such as his payoff, unknown to
other players. Harsanyi’s discovery marked the start
of Bayesian game theory, which now plays a promi-
nent role in game theory and in economics, used in
particular to model auctions.
Here we discuss a strong connection between
Bayesian games and Bell nonlocality. Specifically, the
normal form of a Bayesian game can be reformulated
as a Bell (inequality) test scenario. Central to our
study will be the possibility for the players to use a
common piece of advice (originating e.g. from an ad-
visor), allowing for correlated strategies. The kind of
physical resources available to the advisor limits the
possible strategies of the players. Notably, players
sharing nonlocal resources, such as entangled quan-
tum particles, can outperform players having access
to the most general classical resources. This advan-
tage of nonlocal resources occurs for instance when
the payoff function of the players corresponds to a Bell
inequality, as first discussed by Cheon and Iqbal [8],
and further developed in Refs [9]. However, we shall
see that there exist more general situations, in which
none of the payoffs functions corresponds to a Bell in-
equality, where nonlocal resources (in particular en-
tanglement) provide nevertheless an advantage over
any classical strategy. Notably some of these nonlocal
strategies represent equilibrium points, termed quan-
tum Nash equilibria or non-signaling Nash equilibria.
To illustrate these ideas, we discuss several simple ex-
amples.
Finally, we emphasize that, for the class of games
discussed here (i.e. Bayesian games), quantum me-
chanics provides a clear and indisputable advantage
over classical resources, in the most general sense.
This is in contrast with some previous approaches to
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2quantum games [10], based on non-Bayesian games
(or complete games, such as Prisoner’s dilemma), for
which a quantum advantage is achieved only under
specific restrictions, the relevance of which has been
much debated [11].
FROM BAYESIAN GAMES TO BELL INEQUALITIES
Let us start with the normal form representation of
a game. At this stage, one needs to specify the num-
ber of players, the set of possible strategies for each
player, and the payoff function for each player. To
model Bayesian games, Harsanyi proposed to intro-
duce Nature as an additional player to the game. In
particular, Nature assigns to each player a type, cho-
sen from a given set. The type of each player is gen-
erally unknown to other players, and determines, for
instance, his payoff function. The set of possible types
for each player is thus also part of the definition of a
Bayesian game. More formally, the normal form rep-
resentation of a Bayesian game is given by the follow-
ing ingredients [12]:
1. The number of players N.
2. A set of states of nature Ω, with a prior µ(Ω).
3. For each player i, a set of actions Ai.
4. For each player i, a set of types Xi.
5. For each player i, a mapping τi : Ω→ Xi.
6. For each player i, a payoff function fi : Ω ×
A1 × ... × AN → R, determining the score of
the player for any possible combination of types
and actions.
In the following, we shall focus on the case of two
players, for simplicity. The variable A1 = 0, 1, ...k1
denotes the possible actions of party 1, and X1 =
0, 1, ...m1 denotes the possible types of party 1 etc. We
will also consider that the possible states of Nature
are simply the combination of all possible types (for
all players), that is Ω = (X1,X2). In order to play
the game, each player should decide on a particular
strategy to follow. A pure strategy then consists in as-
sociating an action for every possible type, i.e. a map-
ping si : Xi → Ai. More generally, players may use a
probabilistic strategy, hence it is convenient to define
a probability of an action given a type, i.e. P(Ai|Xi).
An important feature of the game is then the average
payoff function, or the average score, for each player.
For player i this is given by
Fi =∑ µ(X1, X2)P(A1, A2|X1, X2) fi(X1, X2, A1, A2)(1)
where the sum goes over all variables X1, X2, A1, A2.
Note that if the players use pure or inde-
pendent strategies, then P(A1, A2|X1, X2) =
P(A1|X1)P(A2|X2). However, in certain cases
the players may adapt their strategy depending on a
piece of advice. The latter is delivered to all players
by an advisor. This opens the possibility for the
players to adopt correlated strategies, which can
outperform independent strategies. There are various
forms that advice can take. For example in the case of
correlated classical advice, the advice is represented
by a classical variable, λ, with prior ρ(λ). Each player
can then choose a strategy depending on his type and
on λ. In general for classical correlated strategies, we
have that
P(A1, A2|X1, X2) = ∑
λ
ρ(λ)P(A1|X1,λ)P(A2|X2,λ)
6= P(A1|X1)P(A2|X2) (2)
An important point in what follows (and not just in
the case of classical advice) is that the advice must be
independent of the state of Nature, that is, the choice
of types is unknown to the advisor. This enforces the
following condition
P(A1|X1, X2) =∑
A2
P(A1, A2|X1, X2) = P(A1|X1) (3)
which states that the marginal of player 1 does not
depend on the type of player 2; a similar condition
holds for the marginal of player 2. In the context of
Bell nonlocality (as we shall see below), the above
condition plays a prominent role. It is referred to as
the ’no-signaling’ condition, which imposes that the
correlations P(A1, A2|X1, X2) do not allow for player
2 to signal instantaneously to player 1, and thus re-
spect causality and are not in conflict with relativity.
We note that in the context of games, the situation in
which the advice can depend on the types has been
considered [13]; physically this situation is however
not so relevant for us, as it involves signaling.
To analyze games it is often useful to define the set
of all possible pairs of payoff functions {F1, F2}, con-
sidering all possible strategies. It is convenient to rep-
resent geometrically the space of possible payoff func-
tions [12], i.e. here the set of points in R2 with coor-
dinates (F1, F2). In case the players share classical ad-
vice (and the number of possible strategies is finite)
this space is a convex polytope. The space can then be
3conveniently characterized with a finite set of linear
inequalities of the form
N=2
∑
j=1
β jFj ≤ β0 (4)
where β j are real numbers. These inequalities define
the facets of this polytope.
A notion of particular importance in game theory
is that of a Nash equilibrium. In the case the game
features an advisor, there is a more refined notion of
correlated equilibrium [14]. Players achieve a corre-
lated equilibrium for a given set of strategies if each
player has no incentive to change strategy, that is, his
average payoff will not increase by choosing any other
possible strategy (keeping the other player’s strategy
fixed).
We shall see now that the above scenario is closely
related to that of a Bell test. For simplicity, we will
focus on a Bell test with two parties, although more
parties can be considered. We consider two separated
observers, Alice and Bob, sharing a physical resource
distributed by a central source (see Fig. 1). Each ob-
server receives a question to which she/he is asked to
give an answer. In more physical terms, these ques-
tions should be understood as measurement settings,
and the corresponding answers as measurement out-
comes. Importantly each observers knows only his
own question, and does not know which question the
other observers receive. To make the analogy with
a Bayesian game, the questions here correspond to
the type of each player, while the answers correspond
to the actions. Hence we will denote by X1 and X2
the questions of Alice and Bob, respectively, and by
A1 and A2 the corresponding answers. After repeat-
ing the above operation a large number of times, the
statistics of the experiment can be computed, resulting
in the joint probability distribution
P(A1, A2|X1, X2) (5)
which represents the probability of observing a pair of
answers A1, A2, given a pair of questions X1, X2.
In a Bell test, the goal is loosely speaking to cap-
ture the strength and the nature of the correlations
observed in the experiment. In general this may de-
pend on the kind of physical resource distributed by
the source to the observers. A case of particular im-
portance is that of a classical source (i.e. a source of
classical particles). In particular, the particles can be
thought of as carrying information about a common
strategy, which will eventually lead to a correlated be-
haviour in the experiment. The statistics of any exper-
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FIG. 1: Bell inequality test scenario.
iment involving a classical source can be written as
P(A1, A2|X1, X2) =
∫
dλρ(λ)P(A1|X1,λ)P(A2|X2,λ)(6)
where the variable λ (distributed according to the
prior ρ(λ), with
∫
dλρ(λ) = 1) represents the com-
mon strategy, that is, the information distributed from
the source to all the observers. From the point of view
of games, the variable λ represents the advice. Thus
the source models the advisor. Importantly, all possi-
ble strategies for players receiving classical advice (i.e.
from a classical advisor) are of this form.
In his 1964 ground-breaking work, Bell discovered
that, the correlations obtained in any experiment in-
volving a classical source are constrained. More for-
mally, any statistics of the form (6) satisfies a set of
inequalities, now known as Bell inequalities [1]. Gen-
erally, a Bell inequality is based on a linear expression
of the joint probabilities (5), of the form
S = ∑
X1,X2,A1,A2
αX1,X2,A1,A2 P(A1, A2|X1, X2) (7)
where αX1,X2,A1,A2 are real numbers. The maximum of
S over all possible strategies of the form (6) is called
the local bound of the inequality L. Putting all to-
gether, a Bell inequality then reads
S ≤ L. (8)
Now we come to an important point. The average
payoff function (for a given player i) is essentially a
Bell expression. Indeed, Eqs (1) and (7) are exactly of
the same form, with
µ(X1, X2) fi(X1, X2, A1, A2) = αX1,X2,A1,A2 (9)
Hence to any average payoff function Fi can be associ-
ated a Bell expression Si. Moreover, in the presence of
a classical advisor, the following condition must hold:
Fi ≤ L, where L is the local bound of the Bell expres-
sion associated to Fi.
4More generally, note that the above reasoning also
applies to any linear combination of the payoff func-
tions. In particular, the facets of the space of payoff
functions, of the form (4), can also be associated to a
Bell expression S. Thus, in the case of a classical ad-
visor, the condition (4), can be seen as a Bell inequal-
ity, with Bell expression S = ∑ β jFj and local bound
L = β0.
To summarize, the payoff function of a Bayesian
game is basically a Bell expression, and is hence lim-
ited by Bell’s inequality for any strategy involving a
classical advisor. More generally, this applies to linear
combinations of payoff functions, such as those corre-
sponding to the facets of the space of payoff functions.
Next we shall move to quantum mechanics, for which
the situation turns out to be dramatically different!
Remarkably, in experiments involving a source of
quantum particles, Bell’s inequality (8) can be vio-
lated. This means that there exist quantum experi-
ments, the statistics of which cannot be written in the
form (6). This is quantum nonlocality, a phenomenon
repeatedly observed experimentally which has many
applications in quantum information processing.
A crucial feature of quantum correlations is that
they satisfy the no-signaling principle, represented by
conditions of the form (3). This is indeed fundamen-
tal, as it ensures that quantum mechanics is compati-
ble with relativity. It turns out however that there ex-
ist correlations which are stronger than those allowed
in quantum mechanics, which nevertheless satisfy the
no-signaling principle. Such correlations, discovered
by Popescu and Rohrlich [6], are often referred to as
’super-quantum correlations’ or ’nonlocal boxes’.
For Bayesian games, the possibility of having ac-
cess to nonlocal correlations, for instance using en-
tanglement, has important implications. First let us
imagine that the players can share quantum advice,
that is, the advisor is able to produce entangled par-
ticles and to send them to the players, who then per-
form local measurements on their particles. Since the
statistics of such measurements can in general not be
reproduced by any classical local model, the players
now have access to strategies which would be impos-
sible in the case of a classical advisor. Thus, players
sharing quantum advice can outperform any classical
players. More formally, this means that the space of
payoff functions for players sharing quantum advice
can become larger then the space of payoff functions
for classical players. In case one the average payoff
function of one (or more) player corresponds to a Bell
inequality, then quantum resources give an advantage
to the players. Interestingly however, even in the case
none of the payoff functions corresponds to a Bell in-
equality (i.e the highest possible payoff can be reached
classically), it is still possible in certain cases to obtain
a quantum advantage.
Going beyond quantum mechanics, it is relevant
to consider general nonlocal resources in the con-
text of Bayesian games. In general, this allows for
novel strategies, which can outperform both classical
and quantum strategies. Hence the space of payoffs
achievable with no-signaling strategies is in general
larger than in the case of quantum strategies.
Finally, allowing for quantum or super-quantum
strategies also provides novel correlated equilibrium
points to the game. Such points are referred to as
quantum Nash equilibria and no-signaling Nash equi-
libria.
Below we will illustrate these ideas by discussing
a few simple examples of Bayesian games featuring a
’quantum advantage’ and a ’no-signaling advantage’.
EXAMPLES
Example 1. We first consider a simple game be-
tween two players, characterized as follows. For each
player there are only two possible types, X1 = 0, 1 for
the player 1 (from now called Alice), and X2 = 0, 1
for the player 2 (from now called Bob). The set of pos-
sible actions is also composed of two elements only:
actions A1 = 0, 1 for Alice, and A2 = 0, 1 for Bob.
There are thus four possible states of Nature, and we
will consider them equally likely: µ(X1, X2) = 1/4 for
X1, X2 = 0, 1.
Next we define the payoff function of Alice to be
given by
f1(X1, X2, A1, A2) =
{
+4 if A1 ⊕ A2 = X1X2
−4 otherwise (10)
where ⊕ designates addition modulo 2. Thus the av-
erage payoff function of Alice is given by
F1 = E(X1 = X2 = 0) + E(X1 = 0, X2 = 1)
+ E(X1 = 1, X2 = 0)− E(X1 = X2 = 1) (11)
where we have defined the correlation function
E(X1, X2) = P(A1 = A2|X1, X2)− P(A1 6= A2|X1, X2)
We will consider the game to be symmetric hence
the payoff function of Bob is the same as that of Alice,
i.e. F1 = F2.
5Now it turns out that the function (11) is very well
known in quantum mechanics. It is the basis of the
simplest Bell inequality, derived in 1969 by Clauser-
Horne-Shimony-Holt (CHSH) [15]. The CHSH Bell in-
equality reads F1 ≤ 2. In quantum mechanics, by per-
forming judicious measurements on a singlet state, of
the form |ψ−〉 = (|0〉A|1〉B− |1〉A|0〉B)/
√
2, it is possi-
ble to obtain the following set of correlation functions:
Eψ−(X1, X2) = (−1)X1X2
1√
2
(12)
This leads to F1 = 2
√
2 > 2, hence violating the CHSH
inequality. Therefore, the space of possible payoffs in
the case of quantum advice is clearly larger than in the
classical case, since there exist individual values the
payoff function which are not attainable classically.
Moreover, the quantum setting provides here a new
equilibrium point. Indeed it turns out that the value of
F1 = F2 = 2
√
2 is in fact the maximum that is achiev-
able in quantum mechanics [16]. Therefore the point
F1 = F2 = 2
√
2 represents a quantum correlated equi-
librium point, as it is impossible for Alice or Bob to
obtain a larger payoff by adopting any other strategy.
Next let us consider super-quantum correlations.
It turns out that such correlations can give rise to
maximal violation of the CHSH inequality, reaching
CHSH=4. Thus, players sharing such super-quantum
correlations can outperform quantum players in the
above game, and reach F1 = F2 = 4, achieving the
highest possible average payoff. In particular this
is achieved using no-signaling correlations known
as the Popescu-Rohrlich (PR) box, characterized by
EPR(X1, X2) = (−1)X1X2 . Indeed the point F1 = F2 =
4 is a no-signaling Nash equilibrium, since no higher
payoffs are possible.
Example 2. Let us now consider an asymmet-
ric variation of the above game. We take again
µ(X1, X2) = 1/4 for X1, X2 = 0, 1. The payoff func-
tions for Alice and Bob will now be different:
f1(X1, X2, A1, A2) =
{
4(1− X1) if A1 ⊕ A2 = X1X2
−4(1− X1) otherwise
f2(X1, X2, A1, A2) =
{
+4X1 if A1 ⊕ A2 = X1X2
−4X1 otherwise
Hence we obtain the following average payoffs
F1 = E(X1 = X2 = 0) + E(X1 = 0, X2 = 1) (13)
F2 = E(X1 = 1, X2 = 0)− E(X1 = X2 = 1)
It is straightfoward to see that F1 ≤ 2 and F2 ≤
2 for any possible strategy (classical and quantum).
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FIG. 2: Space of possible average payoffs functions for the
Bayesian game of example 2. The pairs of payoffs achievable
with a classical advice are represented by the back polytope
(square). Players sharing a quantum advice have access to
a strictly larger set of possible payoff function, and hence
have an advantage over classical players. The red star repre-
sents the particular quantum strategy mentioned in the text.
Players having access to super-quantum advice can reach all
points, in particular the point F1 = F2 = 2, a no-signaling
Nash equilibrium.
However, in the case of classical advice, it holds that
F1 + F2 ≤ 2, which is simply the CHSH Bell inequal-
ity. Note that this inequality is a facet of the space
of payoffs. Using quantum advice, in particular the
optimal CHSH strategy given in (12), one has that
F1 = F2 =
√
2 < 2, but F1 + F2 = 2
√
2 > 2. Thus,
we obtain a set of average payoffs which cannot be
obtained classically, although each payoff is individu-
ally compatible with a classical model (see Fig. 2).
Note that the space of payoff functions in the case
of quantum advice is not a polytope in general. Here
it can be checked that all points satisfying F21 + F
2
2 =
4 can be attained by performing judicious measure-
ments on a singlet state.
Finally, considering advice based on super-
quantum correlations leads to even better strategies.
Again, the PR box allows both players to reach the
optimal payoff, i.e. achieving F1 = F2 = 2. This point
is a no-signaling Nash equilibrium.
Example 3. Our final example will be more con-
crete. The players are two companies, both interested
in buying jointly some pieces of land, potentially rich
in a certain resource. Company A has expertise in ex-
tracting this resource, while company B has expertise
in selling and distributing it. Hence an association
is potentially profitable for both companies, which
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FIG. 3: Payoffs for the Bayesian game of example 3.
would then share the net profit equally.
For company A, the price of production may vary,
depending on various parameters, which represent
the type of company A. Here the extraction cost can
be either low or high (with equal probability), which
an expert of company A can evaluate. For company
B, the type is the supply on the market, which can be
either low or high (with equal probability), evaluated
by an expert of company B. Note that the type of each
company is private, since each company is reluctant
to let the other know about much benefit it could po-
tentially make.
The sale is organized as follows. Both companies
will be asked simultaneously, to bid or not on a par-
ticular piece of land. If at least one company bids, the
piece of land is sold. All money that is bid is retained,
hence if both companies bid, their profit is lower than
if only one of them bids. If both the extraction cost
and supply on the market are low, the profit will be
high. If the extraction cost is low but the supply is
high (or conversely) the profit is medium. If both the
extraction cost and supply are high, the companies go
bankrupt if they bid. The payoff functions for this
Bayesian game are given in Fig. 3.
It is not difficult to see that, in the case the compa-
nies have access to classical advice, the largest possi-
ble average payoff for each company is FA,B = 3/2.
However, having access to quantum advice, the com-
panies can achieve FA,B ' 1.5365 > 3/2. This is
achieved by performing suitably chosen local mea-
surements on a singlet state. Moreover, this point rep-
resents a quantum correlated Nash equilibrium, since
no better score can be achieved.
DISCUSSION
We have discussed a strong connection between
Bell nonlocalty and Bayesian games. This lead us to
see that players sharing advice based on nonlocal cor-
relations, for instance using quantum entanglement,
can outperform players sharing (any possible) classi-
cal advice. Considering the quantum case, it is im-
portant to emphasize that the advantage provided by
quantum resources is here fully general. Hence it does
not rely on any specific restrictions, contrary to pre-
vious approaches to quantum games [10] which then
lead to controversy [11]. The main point is that these
approaches focused on games with complete informa-
tion (such as Prisoner’s dilemma), where the notion
of type is not present, in contrast to Bayesian games.
This is perhaps expressed even more clearly from the
point of view of nonlocality: a Bell test can separate
quantum from classical predictions only if each ob-
server can choose between several possible measure-
ments to perform.
Finally, we believe that the connection presented
here may also benefit nonlocality. Besides providing
new potential applications for quantum nonlocality,
along with quantum communications [3] and com-
munication complexity [4], it also raises interesting is-
sues, in particular the possibility of detecting nonlocal
correlations via a set of Bell type inequalities, rather
than from a single Bell parameter.
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